Preventing Spousal Disinheritance: An Equitable Solution by Curnutte, Scott A.
Volume 92 Issue 2 Article 6 
January 1990 
Preventing Spousal Disinheritance: An Equitable Solution 
Scott A. Curnutte 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott A. Curnutte, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance: An Equitable Solution, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. (1990). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/6 
This Student Work is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
PREVENTING SPOUSAL DISINHERITANCE:
AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 441
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ........................................ 443
III. FRAUrD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE: THE JUDICIAL
APPROACH ....................................... ............. 444
A. The Problems Presented by Will Substitutes ........ 444
B. The Judicial Approach ..................................... 446
1. "Illusory Transfer" Test ............................. 446
2, "Intent to Defraud" Test ......... ........ 447
3. "Present Donative Intent" Test ................... 449
4. Synopsis .................................................. 450
IV. WEST VIRGINIA FORCED SHARE LAW ......................... 452
V. STATUTORY ALTERNATIVES ....................................... 455
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 457
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries men and women have wrestled with the problem
of spousal disinheritance.' For every determined effort to devise an
equitable and foolproof mechanism to prevent disinheritance, there
have been equally determined efforts to accomplish exactly that. The
approach used most frequently today in the separate property ju-
risdictions, 2 like West Virginia, is the statutory forced share which
1. See infra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
2. It is important to note that forced share law is a consequence of the concept of separate
ownership of marital property. In the community-property states (community of acquests), each spouse
has an immediate one-half interest in the fruits of the marriage in recognition of the collaborative
nature of marriage, and thus a forced share law is unnecessary (except that California and Idaho
have addressed the problem of migratory spouses through the application of a statutory share to
quasi-community property acquired elsewhere which would have been community property if it had
been earned in a community-property state). See Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's
Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 303 (1987).
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"guarantees" the surviving spouse a share (usually one-third) of the
decedent's probate estate.' Because these statutes base the surviving
spouse's share on the size of the probate estate, however, they invite
evasion. The testator may simply deplete the probate estate through
the use of various "will substitutes." ' 4 Moreover, these statutory
forced share schemes fail to adequately accomplish the purposes for
which they were designed: support for the surviving spouse and rec-
ognition of the contribution which the surviving spouse made to the
decedent's estate.
There are various approaches to prevent so-called "fraud on the
widow's share, ' 5 in which the decedent depletes the probate estate
through inter vivos transfers. This comment will examine two of the
most important. First, many states, like West Virginia, retain the
traditional forced share statute6 (West Virginia also retains a stat-
utory form of dower)7 and use a case-by-case judicial inquiry into
the testator's use of various will substitutes. Under this approach
property transferred out of the estate is considered part of the pro-
bate estate if the conveyance is "illusory," ' 8 if the decedent "in-
tended to defraud" 9 the surviving spouse of his marital right in the
estate, or if the decedent lacked "present donative intent"10 with
respect to the transfer.
A more predictable result is achieved by a forced share statute
which mechanically takes into account will substitutes. Professors
Langbein and Waggoner have proposed a statutory system of "in-
cremental vesting" of the spouse's share of an augmented estate."
3. IIA ScoTT & FRATCHER, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 146A (1988).
4. Will substitutes are devices used to pass property at death outside of the probate process.
Many of them enable the testator to retain a life interest in the property while assuring its exclusion
from the probate estate. The will substitutes most frequently employed include life insurance policies,
employee benefit plans, joint and survivor annuities, joint bank accounts, joint tenancy, P.O.D.
accounts, Totten trusts and revocable inter vivos trusts. Comment, Protection of the Base for the
Surviving Spouse's Election: The Search for an Alternative, 7 CAP. U. L. Rev. 423, 423 (1978).
5. W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON mE Wmow's SHARE (1960).
6. W. VA. CODE §§ 42-3-1, 42-2-1, 43-1-1 (repl. vol. 1982).
7. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-1 (repl. vol. 1982).
8. See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
9. See, e.g., Warren v. Compton, 626 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. at 12
(Tenn. 1981).
10. See, e.g., Toman v. Svoboda, 39 11. App. 3d 394, 349 N.E.2d 668 (1976).
11. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2.
[Vol. 92
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This system increases over time the share the surviving spouse is
entitled to, up to a total of one-half of the augmented estate. The
augmented estate concept used in this system is derived from that
used in the Uniform Probate Code. The surviving spouse's share is
calculated from a combined estate which is augmented to include
will substitutes, thereby preventing the use of these mechanisms to
reduce the surviving spouse's share of the estate. The major benefit
of this scheme over the Uniform Probate Code approach is that it
better accomplishes the dual purposes of forced share statutes: sup-




The protection of a decedent's wife from disinheritance began
as early as the Code of Hammurabi, and can be traced through
Roman, Germanic, Scandinavian and Saxon law. 13 At common law,
the surviving spouse was not an heir.' 4 Instead, widows were pro-
tected by the device of dower which created a life estate in one-
third of all lands in which a widow's deceased husband was seised
of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage. 5 A
widower, on the other hand, was entitled to curtesy if a live child
was born of the marriage.' 6 Curtesy consisted of a life estate in all
of the wife's inheritable land.' 7 Neither dower nor curtesy could be
defeated by will or inter vivos conveyance without the cooperation
of the other spouse.
1 8
In an agrarian society in which the major form of wealth was
land, dower worked well to provide economic security for the
widow.' 9 As time passed, however, land became "more and more
12. Id. at 306-10.
13. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an
Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REv. 981, 982-983 (1977). See also 1 C. SCRIBNER, TREATISE
ON Tim LAW OF DOWER 1-22 (2d ed. 1883).
14. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037, 1045 (1966).




19. Kurtz, supra note 13, at 985.
1990]
3
Curnutte: Preventing Spousal Disinheritance: An Equitable Solution
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
an article of commerce and less a symbol of status and power," 20
and the interference of dower with the free alienability of land be-
came less tolerable.2' Finally, in 1833 England enacted legislation
that allowed a husband to defeat his wife's dower by will or by
inter vivos conveyance, leaving dower to operate only in the event
of intestacy.
22
Common-law dower was part of the received common law of
the original American colonies and most of the states .2  As time
passed, the same problems that led to the end of dower in England
prompted varied legislative responses in America, often including
the abolition of dower and curtesy and the use of forced share sta-
tutes.24 However, significant vestiges of common-law dower remain
in the probate codes of some states: the different treatment of real
and personal property, the one-third share accorded the surviving
spouse, and the limitation of the interest in real property to a life
estate .25
III. "FRAUD ON THE WIDow's SNAR": THE JuDIcIAL APPROACH
A. The Problems Presented by Will Substitutes
Many states, including West Virginia, currently protect a spouse
against disinheritance by providing the right to a statutorily fixed
share of the decedent's probate estate in lieu of the share provided
in the will. 26 There are two purposes which these forced share sta-
tutes are designed to achieve. The first is to assure support for the
surviving spouse. The second is essentially restitutionary, a recog-
nition of marriage as a partnership in which both spouses contribute
to the accumulation of the family assets.27
20. Id. at 987.
21. Id.
22. Dower Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, § 4.
23. C. SCRIBNER, supra note 13, at 23-58.
24. Kurtz, supra note 13, at 988-99.
25. SAAMAS, SALMON AND DAB~IN, IN-ERITANCE IN AMERICA 4 (1987). See, e.g., W. VA. CODE
§§ 42-3-1, 42-2-1, 43-1-1 (repl. vol. 1982).
26. Comment, Protection of the Base for the Surviving Spouse's Election: The Search for an
Alternative, 7 CAP. U, L. Ray. 423 (1978).
27. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 307.
[Vol. 92
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The problem is that neither of these purposes is well served by
a statutory scheme which is easily evaded by depleting the probate
estate through nominal inter vivos transfers. Because most forced
share statutes calculate the spouse's share as a fraction of the pro-
bate estate, a testator may substantially reduce the amount that the
surviving spouse can receive by utilizing various will substitutes such
as life insurance policies, employee benefit plans, joint and survivor
annuities, joint tenancies, joint bank accounts, Totten trusts, P.O.D.
accounts, and revocable inter vivos trusts. 28 By failing to take ac-
count of will substitutes in the calculation of the surviving spouse's
share, forced share statutes invite attempts at evasion through the
use of these devices. As long as the depletion of the probate estate
through the use of these will substitutes is accomplished through
complete transfers of the property involved, courts generally hold
that they are valid. 29 If, however, the transferror retains substantial
control over the property during his lifetime, an otherwise valid inter
vivos transfer may be considered "fraud on the marital property
rights.''30
It should also be noted that failure to take will substitutes into
account in the computation of the forced share can cause problems
of the opposite sort by ignoring the fact that spouses often make
adequate provision for each other through the use of various will
substitutes." Professor Fratcher uses an illustrative example of this
point. Suppose a man has a farm worth $100,000, a son by his first
wife who has helped him work it for years, and a second wife whom
he has designated as the beneficiary of a $200,000 life insurance
policy. If the man's will leaves the farm to his son, under the typical
forced share statute the widow can keep all of the life insurance
proceeds and also elect to take a forced share of one-third of the
farm,3 2 notwithstanding the testator's clear intent and the son's le-
gitimate expectation.
28. Comment, supra note 26, at 423.
29. See, e.g., Warren v. Compton, 626 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id., at 12
(Tenn. 1981); Johnson v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 379 S.E.2d 752, 756-57 (W. Va. 1989);
Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 73 Ill. 2d 342, 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 (1978); Staples v. King, 433
A.2d 407, 409-10 (Me. 1981).
30. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 73 Ill. 2d 342, 383 N.E.2d 185 (1978).
31. Fratcher, supra note 14, at 1058.
32. Id. at 1058.
1990]
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B. The Judicial Approach
The ineffectiveness of forced share legislation in dealing with the
problems generated by will substitutes has prompted varied and con-
fusing judicial approaches. 33 Courts have announced supposedly dis-
tinct standards such as the "illusory transfer" or "retention of
control" test, the "intent to defraud" test, and the "present don-
ative intent" test to deal with the problems. However, the tests often
overlap and the same language is often used to describe different
tests.
3 4
1. "Illusory Transfer" Test
The "illusory transfer" or "retention of control" 5 test was
adopted by the Court of Appeals of New York in Newman v. Dore.16
In Newman, the court was presented with the issue of whether a
husband could defeat his wife's forced share by transferring all of
his property into a revocable inter vivos trust for the benefit of his
child from a prior marriage. 7 The decedent in Newman left a will
which provided a trust for his wife for her life of one-third of his
real and personal property (the share she would receive if she elected
against the estate, calculated as a fraction of the probate estate),
which under New York law precluded her from electing against the
will.38 Three days before his death, however, the decedent established
another trust by which he transferred all of his property in trust
33. See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937), Warren v. Compton, 626
S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. at 12 (Tenn. 1981), Toman v. Svoboda, 39 I1. App.
3d 394, 349 N.E.2d 668 (1976).
34. Browder, Giving or Leaving What is a Will?, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 845, 880 (1977).
35. The terms are interchangeable because a transfer is considered to be "illusory" if the donor
retains substantial control over the property.
36. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
37. Id. at 375, 9 N.E.2d at 967. The facts of this famous elective share case do not appear
in the court's opinion, but they are rather interesting. The decedent, Mr. Straus, married his second
wife Clara when he was 76 years old and she was in her thirties. By the time that Mr. Straus died
four years later, their relationship had deteriorated to the point that she had filed for separation with
alimony, complaining that his perverted sexual habits made it impossible for her to live with him,
and he in turn brought an action for annulment. Both actions were still pending at the time of his
death. Mr. Straus had also instructed his attorney to see that that "whore" and "son-of-a-bitch"
did not receive any of his estate. E. CARK, L. LusKY & A. MUR.PHY, CASES AND MATERIALS O
G Aurrous TANSFERS (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter E. CLARK].
38. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. at 375, 9 N.E.2d at 967.
[Vol. 92
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which excluded her, thus leaving no property for his widow to take. 39
The court noted that in the second trust the decedent reserved to
himself not only the income from the trust for his life and the right
to revoke the trust, but also substantial control over the trustees. 40
The court in Newman rejected the use of motive or intent as a
test of the validity of a transfer because the widow had only an
expectant interest in the property of her husband and thus the law
did not restrict the transfer of property by the husband during his
lifetime. 41 Instead, the court applied the test of "whether the hus-
band has in good faith divested himself of ownership of his property
or has made an illusory transfer.''42 Under this test the court con-
cluded that although the trust would be valid but for the widow's
right of election, the testator had made an invalid illusory transfer
of the property judged by the substance, not the form, of the con-
veyance.43 Thus, the entire trust was held to be invalid. 44
The Newman decision was criticized because in effect it created
a preferred status for the spouse regardless of whether the spouse
needed or deserved preferential treatment.45 Moreover, the decision
was problematic because it provided no guidance as to the amount
of control that could legitimately be retained by a donor.46
2. "Intent to Defraud" Test
An example of the application of the "intent to defraud" test
is the case of Warren v. Compton,47 in which the Tennessee Court
39. Id. at 375, 9 N.E.2d at 967.
40. Id. at 377, 9 N.E.2d at 968.
41. Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 968-69.
42. Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
43. Id. at 380, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
44. Id. at 381, 9 N.E.2d at 970. New York abandoned the judicial approach to the problem
of "fraud on the widow's share" in 1966 and adopted an augmented estate approach which treats
as testamentary dispositions causa mortis gifts, Totten trusts, joint bank accounts, joint tenancy prop-
erty, and transfers by a decedent over which he retained a power to revoke or invade. However, the
statute provides that the probate estate does not include insurance or retirement benefits. N.Y. Est.,
Powers & Trusts Law 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981).
45. E. CLAaRK, supra note 37, at 519.
46. In Davis v. KB & T, 309 S.E.2d 45 (W.Va. 1983), the settlor's attorney testified that he
recommended to his client that the trust be revocable: "I would never recommend to a person that
they execute an irrevocable trust, because he might have very well not liked the way the bank was
handling the affair, and I wouldn't under any circumstances want to put someone in that position."
Id. at 51 n.4.
47. 626 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Ct. App.) cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1981).
1990]
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of Appeals was confronted with the validity of two transfers made
by the decedent allegedly with the intent to defeat his widow's elec-
tive share. One of the transfers was a $40,000 certificate of deposit
Which the decedent purchased for his girlfriend, and the other was
the decedent's delivery of two promissory notes worth $17,300 to
his daughter by a previous marriage. 4 The decedent's will provided
his widow with the same share of the estate she would have received
if she had elected against the will.49
The court in Warren had to deal with a confusing line of pre-
cedents because some cases in Tennessee had used the "fraudulent
intent" test and some had used the "illusory transfer" test.5 0 The
court concluded that the appropriate test was whether there was a
fraudulent transfer with the intent to deprive the surviving spouse
of his share of the decedent's estate. Although an illusory transfer
may be one factor to consider in determining the decedent's intent,
the intent to defeat the surviving spouse's share must have been
present at the time of the transfer in order to invalidate a transfer."
The court in Warren also listed other factors to be considered in
determining the decedent's intent: whether the transfer was made
without consideration, the relative size of the transfer, the time be-
tween the transfer and the decedent's death, the nature of the marital
relationship, the source of the property and whether the decedent
made other provisions for the surviving spouse in a will or through
gifts.5 2 A court should consider "all facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the transfer. 5 3 Applying the test that it set forth, the court
concluded that both transfers were valid, even though both transfers
were gifts without consideration, both were completed within one
year of the decedent's death, and the Warrens' marriage was at best
"turbulent."
54
48. Id. at 15.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 15-18. The decedent had resumed a prior relationship with Ms. Compton (the recipient
of the $40,000 CD) soon after his marriage to Mrs. Warren. In fact, the decedent apparently had
eaten his dinner at Ms. Compton's home every night for the fifteen years preceding his death. Id.
[Vol. 92
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Unfortunately, the "intent to defraud" test provides even less
guidance than the "illusory transfer" test. Since intent is a difficult
thing to prove, courts must rely on equitable factors such as the
ones cited by the Warren court, and the test becomes a standardless
"balancing of the equities."
3. "Present Donative Intent" Test
In Toman v. Svoboda,5 5 the Appellate Court of Illinois discussed
at some length the rationale of the "present donative intent" test.
The decedent, Mr. Toman, died intestate.56 The only substantial as-
sets owned by him at that time were his interest as a joint tenant
with Mrs. Toman in their marital home and his interest as a joint
tenant with the defendant, his sister, in shares of stock which were
worth approximately $20,000.17 About ten years before he died, the
decedent transferred shares of stock that he owned in his own name
to his mother, his sister and himself as joint tenants with right of
survivorship.5 8 Shortly thereafter his mother died and the shares were
transferred on the respective corporate books to his sister and him-
self as joint tenants with right of survivorship.5 9 During the dece-
dent's lifetime all dividends from the stock were received by him
and used as his property, and his widow argued that the decedent
had transferred the stock for the sole purpose of defeating her stat-
utory marital rights in the stock. 6°
The court in Toman noted that the Illinois statutory forced share,
unlike common-law dower, has no inchoate stage since it applies
only to the property which the decedent owns at the time of his
death.61 Thus, the forced share statute could be legitimately defeated
by the decedent simply by making real (as opposed to illusory) inter
vivos donative transfers of all of his property, even if the decedent's
express intent was to defeat his widow's statutory share in the prop-
55. 39 Ill. App. 3d 394, 349 N.E.2d 668 (1976).
56. Id. at 396, 349 N.E.2d at 671.
57. Id. at 396, 349 N.E.2d at 670-71.
58. Id. at 396, 349 N.E.2d at 671.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 396, 349 N.E.2d at 670-71.
61. Id. at 397-98, 349 N.E.2d at 672.
1990]
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erty. 62 If, however, the gift was not a real gift because there was
no present donative intent (or if the donative intent was merely
testamentary), then the transfer was illusory and therefore ineffective
to defeat the surviving spouse's statutory marital rights in the prop-
erty. 63 Thus, the court declared, the appropriate test is whether the
decedent intended to make a present gift (even if it is a present gift
of a future interest), not whether the decedent intended to minimize
the surviving spouse's share of the property.64 Factors which the
court noted would be relevant in determining the decedent's intent
include the secretive manner in which the donor acted as to the
surviving spouse, what the donor might have said to others as to
his intent in making the apparent gift, the proximity in time between
the transfer and the donor's death, and the value of the donor's
estate and the value of property left to the surviving spouse. 65
Applying the "present donative intent" test, the court concluded
that the presumption of a present donative intent was not sufficiently
rebutted by evidence that the decedent had apparently retained a
life estate in the shares of stock, and therefore the transfer was
valid. 66
4. Synopsis
Given the myriad competing policy issues encompassed in the
concept of spousal protection, 67 it is not surprising that courts have
been unable to arrive at a single standard for the validity of will
substitutes. The "intent to defraud" test is problematic because in-
validating transfers based on the intent of the donor has the effect
62. Id. at 398, 349 N.E.2d at 672-73. Note that the "intent to defraud" test in its purest form
would invalidate such a transfer because it would be deemed to have been in fraud of the statutory
marital rights. As applied by most of the states which use the "intent to defraud" test, however, the
test is effectually a "balancing of the equities" test which considers a number of factors in determining
the validity of the transfer. See, e.g., Warren v. Compton, 626 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Ct. App.) cert.
denied, id. at 12 (Tenn. 1981).
63. Toman, 39 Ill. App. 3d at 399, 349 N.E.2d at 673.
64. Id. at 399-400, 349 N.E.2d at 674.
65. Id. at 399, 349 N.E.2d at 673.
66. Id. at 402, 349 N.E.2d at 675.
67. These policy issues include recognition of the collaborative nature of marriage, concern
that the surviving spouse is adequately provided for, the concept of complete ownership of property,
the society's interest in the free alienability of land, etc.
[Vol. 92
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of putting the validity of any transfer by a married person in doubt.
Thus, this test too often ends up depending simply on whether the
judge approves of the way that the decedent handled his family's
affairs. The "illusory transfer" or "retention of control" test is the
most objective in theory, but it begs the question of why a certain
amount of control such as the power of revocation does not in-
validate a will substitute, while other indicia of control constitute
fraud on the surviving spouse's rights. Finally, the "present donative
intent" test is more internally logical than either of the other tests
since it addresses the underlying rationale of forced-share statutes.
However, in practice it offers almost no intrinsic guidance as to
what transfers are legitimate and which are not, and so this test,
like the others, ends up as a standardless inquiry into the circum-
stances surrounding the transfer. Obviously these tests overlap to a
great degree in theory and in practice, and courts sometimes feel
compelled to reconcile the different tests. In Johnson v. La Grange
State Bank,68 the Supreme Court of Illinois made a heroic, if some-
what lengthy, effort to synthesize the various tests:
We conclude that an inter vivos transfer of property is valid as against the marital
rights of the surviving spouse unless the transaction is tantamount to a fraud as
manifested by the absence of donative intent to make a conveyance of a present
interest in the property conveyed. Without such intent the transfer would simply
be a sham or merely a colorable or illusory transfer of legal title. 9
Unfortunately, when the court applied its new test, it did not
specify any particular facts which would indicate the requisite intent.
The court considered not only the degree of control over the trust
retained by the decedent, but also the wealth of the respective spouses,
the felicity of the marital relationship, and the needs of the relatives
benefited by the trust.
70
Despite the careful enunciation of specific tests by courts, the
outcome of these cases depends to a great degree on the subjective
opinion of the court as to whether a will substitute should be upheld
68. 73 Ill. 2d 342, 383 N.E.2d 185 (1978).
69. Id. at 361, 383 N.E.2d at 194.
70. Id. at 364, 383 N.E.2d at 195. The court considered similar facts in the case of Havey v.
Patton which was consolidated on appeal with Johnson.
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or invalidated for the benefit of the surviving spouse. While indi-
vidual justice of this sort is undoubtedly a laudable goal, estate
planning is an area in which clear standards are needed so that
planning an estate can be more than mere guesswork as to the out-
come of a potential challenge.
IV. WEST VIRGINIA FORCED SHARE LAw
West Virginia protects the surviving spouse from disinheritance
through the use of a forced share statute which provides that if a
spouse renounces the share provided in the will or if no provision
is made in the will for the surviving spouse,
... [S]uch surviving wife or husband shall have such share in the real and
personal estate of the decedent as such surviving wife or husband would have
taken if the decedent had died intestate leaving children; otherwise the surviving
spouse shall have no more of the decedent's estate than is given by the will.7'
A spouse who renounces a will, therefore, receives one-third of
'the decedent's personalty, 72 and a statutory dower interest in the
realty, which is a life estate in one-third of the lands of which the
decedent was seised of an inheritable estate .7  The dower interest
may be either assigned in kind, 74 or in a lump sum payment. 75 As
noted above, a forced share statute such as West Virginia's, which
71. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (repl. vol. 1982).
72. W. VA. CODE § 42-2-1 (repl. vol. 1982):
When any person shall die intestate as to his personal estate or any part thereof, the surplus,
after payment of funeral expenses, charges of administration and debts, shall pass and be
distributed to and among the same persons, and in the same proportions, that real estate
is directed to descend, except as follows:
(a) If the intestate was a married woman, and leave issue surviving, her husband shall be
entitled to one third of such surplus, and if she leave no issue, he shall be entitled to the
whole thereof;
(b) If the intestate leave a widow and issue by the same or a former marriage, the widow
shall be entitled to one third of such surplus, and if he leave no such issue, she shall be
entitled to the whole thereof.
73. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-1 (repl. vol. 1982):
A surviving spouse shall be endowed of one third of all the real estate whereof the deceased
spouse, or any other to his or her use, ,or in trust for him or her, was, at any time during
the coverture, seised of or entitled to an estate of inheritance, either in possession, reversion,
remainder, or otherwise, unless the right of such surviving spouse to such dower shall have
been lawfully barred or relinquished.
74. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-12 (repl. vol. 1982).
75. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-20 (repl. vol. 1982).
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calculates the surviving spouse's share only from the probate estate,
is ineffective in protecting the spouse from disinheritance.76
The responsibility of balancing the testator's right to control his
property and the need to protect the surviving spouse from disin-
heritance through will substitutes has fallen on the courts. In Davis
v. KB & T Co., 77 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
addressed the validity of a revocable inter vivos trust which allegedly
operated as a fraud upon the surviving spouse's statutory marital
rights. In Davis, the decedent established a revocable inter vivos trust
shortly after his wife suffered a mental breakdown and he himself
suffered several heart attacks.78 The trust instrument provided that
the income from the trust was to be paid to himself during his
lifetime, and thereafter to his wife if she needed it, and upon her
death the assets were to be distributed to his relatives (the couple
had no children) 7 The decedent transferred most of his assets to
the trust, about $172,000, leaving a probate estate valued at only
$12,000.0 Davis, on behalf of her incompetent sister, renounced the
will and brought suit to have the trust invalidated.
81
After reviewing the various tests mentioned above and noting the
lack of a clear majority test, the court decided that the appropriate
course was "to adopt a flexible standard which takes into account
all of the circumstances and weighs the equities on each side."8s2 The
court noted that some circumstances which might be relevant in a
given case include completeness of the transfer, motive of the trans-
feror, participation by the transferee in the alleged fraud on the
surviving spouse, amount of time between the transfer and death,
degree to which the surviving spouse is left without an interest in
the decedent's property, and other means of available support.83 In
concluding that the trust in this case was valid, the court considered
76. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
77. 309 S.E.2d 45 (,V. Va. 1983).




82. Id. at 50.
83. Id. at 50 n.3 (quoting Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 12, 106 A.2d 72, 77 (1954)).
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the discretion given to the trustee in the trust (the court noted that
the mere retention of a power of revocation, standing alone, is in-
sufficient to render a trust illusory or testamentary in character),
the decedent's purpose in creating the trust (to provide for himself
and his wife in the event that he became further incapacitated), the
surviving spouse's independent wealth, and the decedent's role in
the acquisition of his wife's estate. 84
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again addressed
the validity of a revocable inter vivos trust in Johnson v. Farmers
and Merchants Bank.85 Once more the court reviewed the bewil-
dering array of tests used in other jurisdictions to decide whether
an inter vivos trust is invalid as a fraud upon the marital rights of
the surviving spouse, and reiterated the test to be used in West
Virginia.
Fred Johnson and Dorothy Johnson married in 1963, and while
there were no children of the marriage, Mr. Johnson had two adopted
sons from a previous marriage who were in their early teens at the
time of his marriage to Dorothy.16 Mr. Johnson had accumulated
over $1,000,000 in assets represented by varying degrees of own-
ership of three closely-held corporations which he managed. 7 In
1982, Mr. Johnson created a revocable trust containing most of his
assets, appointing the Farmers and Merchants Bank as trustee and
naming himself as lifetime beneficiary. 8 Upon Mr. Johnson's death,
the trustee was to place $250,000 into a trust for the benefit of his
widow for life, and the remainder in a trust for the benefit of his
sons.89 The court noted that Mr. Johnson retained the right to man-
age the trust property without paying the bank any commission and
reserved the voting rights of the stock placed in trust.90 In fact, the
trustee stated to the court that it had no authority with regard to
the three corporations noted above. 91 In short, Mr. Johnson retained
84. Id. at 51.
85. Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 379 S.E.2d 752 (NV. Va. 1989).
86. Id. at 754.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 755.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 760-61.
[Vol. 92
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considerable control over the trust. Upon his death, Johnson's pro-
bate estate was valued at $158,524 while the trust assets were valued
at $1,377,039.92 Mrs. Johnson renounced the will, under which she
was entitled to receive personal property valued at $12,750 and jointly
owned assets worth $7,250, and brought suit to have the inter vivos
trust set aside as an illusory transfer in fraud upon her marital rights. 93
The court in Johnson used the test enunciated in Davis: "a flex-
ible standard which takes into account all of the circumstances and
weighs the equities on each side."194 The court noted that Mrs. John-
son had a very modest estate of her own,95 and was completely
unaware of the creation of the trust.96 More importantly, the court
emphasized the substantial control that Mr. Johnson had retained
in the property and concluded that the inter vivos transfer was il-
lusory, and the property should be included in his probate estate so
that Mrs. Johnson could receive her fraction.
97
While most people would agree that the results in the Davis and
Johnson cases were equitable, the "balancing the equities" approach
is unsatisfactory. While it may be more straightforward than doing
the same thing under the color of an objective test as other courts
seem to have done, this lack of a standard could easily lead to
inconsistent results and does not provide any clear guidance for
someone who wishes to plan an estate using will substitutes. The
better solution is to adopt a statutory plan which mechanically pre-
vents the use of will substitutes to cheat the surviving spouse.
V. STATUTORY ALTERNATIVE
One of the first separate-property states to provide a statutory,
mechanical solution to the problems presented by will substitutes,
92. Id. at 755.
93. Id. at 756.
94. Id. at 759 (quoting Davis v. KB & T 309 S.E.2d 45, 50 (NV. Va. 1983)).
95. Id. at 759. Mrs. Johnson's estate included an undivided one half interest in the family
residence. The record indicated that about one year after her husband's death, Mrs. Johnson received
a letter from the Farmers & Merchants Bank informing her that Mr. Johnson's two sons wished to
sell their undivided one-half interest in the home because they felt that the real estate should be
producing income for their benefit. The letter also indicated that if she did not agree to sell the
house, she would be charged a "monthly rental fee of $500 per month, starting with April 1, 1983"
(eleven months prior to the letter). Id. at 759 n.10.
96. Id. at 759-60.
97. Id. at 760-62.
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instead of an ad hoc judicial approach, was New York.9 8 In 1965
the New York legislature amended its forced share statute by enu-
merating certain inter vivos transfers99 which were considered "tes-
tamentary substitutes" and thus included in the probate estate for
the calculation of the surviving spouse's forced share.1t ° One year
later, the legislature repealed Section 18101 and enacted instead Sec-
tion 5-1.1 which clarified the statute's purpose and scope. 10 2
The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code expanded the New
York approach into an "augmented estate" concept. 0 Under the
UPC, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of the decedent's
augmented estate.104 The augmented estate includes not only the net
probate estate, but also the value of certain will substitutes, some-
times called "recapturables," 105 and the value of property owned by
the surviving spouse which was derived from the decedent, called
the spousal setoff'06 (property which would have been included in
the surviving spouse's augmented estate if the spouse had prede-
ceased the decedent). 107 The surviving spouse is entitled to one-third
of this total, but this is offset by the amount already received as
represented by the spousal setoff.
Although the augmented estate concept has been effective in the
states which have enacted it in preventing the use of will substitutes
to reduce the share of the surviving spouse, it has proved somewhat
98. 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 665, § 1 (amending N.Y. Decedent Estate Law 18). The New York
legislature noted that the use of judicially sanctioned inter vivos conveyances to deplete the probate
estate had the effect of "reducing the surviving spouse's right of election to absurdity." N.Y. EsT.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981) (Practice commentary).
99. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18-a(l)(a) - (e) (McKinney 1966), treated as testamentary
substitutes: causa mortis gifts, joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety, and "any disposition of
property, in trust or otherwise, as to which the deceased spouse retained, by express provision of the
disposing instrument either alone or in conjunction with another person, a power to revoke the dis-
position of the assets thereof." Id. § 18-a(l)(e).
100. Id. § 18-a(1).
101. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 14-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
102. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981).
103. U.P.C. Art. II, Part 2, General Comment (1988).
104. U.P.C. § 2-201 (1988).
105. U.P.C. § 2-202(l) (1988). See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 317.
106. U.P.C. § 2-202(2) (1988). Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 317.
107. U.P.C. § 2-202 (1988).
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difficult to apply.'0 In particular, the spousal setoff provision has
produced problems akin to the "tracing" problems faced in com-
munity property jurisdictions in trying to decide who owns what and
where it came from.109
The "incremental vesting" scheme avoids the tracing problem
by using a combined augmented estate which merges both the de-
cedent's and the surviving spouse's augmented estates. The combined
estate would include the decedent's net probate estate plus the value
of "recapturables" and the surviving spouse's net worth plus the
value of recapturables stemming from that spouse. Thus, the sur-
viving spouse's share is calculated from the combined augmented
estate, but the spouse is charged with receipt of an appropriate
amount of his own augmented estate."10
The share to which the surviving spouse is entitled in this system
is one-half of the combined augmented estate, but this share vests
incrementally over time. For example, 10% of the forced share would
vest as of the date of the marriage, and the remainder would vest
in 5% annual increments."'
The major advantage of this approach is that it accomplishes
the dual purposes of forced share law-support for the surviving
spouse and recognition of the contribution which the spouse made
to the decedent's estate-in a mechanical fashion which does not
require judicial discretion to reach an equitable result' In addition,
the "incremental vesting" system represents a vast improvement over
traditional forced share laws by being sensitive to the duration of
the marriage in the calculation of the forced share.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ad hoc judicial approach adopted by the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals in Davis and Johnson does not provide
adequate protection of the surviving spouse from disinheritance be-
108. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 303. See also Kurtz, supra note 13.
109. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 318.
110. Id. at 318-19.
111. The authors note that they do not recommend a specific vesting schedule, the idea is simply
to increase the entitlement as the length of the marriage increases. Id. at 316-17.
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cause it fails to establish a clear standard; the spouse must be sat-
isfied with a promise to "weigh the equities." Moreover, the lack
of an appropriate standard provides no guidance to estate planners
who wish to use will substitutes in an estate plan. West Virginia is
not alone in this respect, however, because the judicial approach to
this problem produces similar results in the other jurisdictions which
use it. The best way to predictably protect the surviving spouse from
disinheritance is through the use of a forced share statute which
mechanically includes will substitutes in the calculation of the spouse's
forced share. Not only is the "incremental vesting" scheme the best
solution because of its application to the problem of "fraud on the
widow's share," it is the best system to accomplish the purposes of
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